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Situatin~ the Research A~enda
The Muda Irrigation Scheme
The M uda Irrigation Scheme was estab-
lished to fulfill the goals of the National Rice
Policy (NRP), i.e., to achieve self-sufficiency
in rice production for domestic needs, to im-
prove farmers' socio-economic well-being(vis-
a-vis an increase in farm income) of padi
farmers, and to supply rice at a reasonable
price to consumers and at a minimal cost to
the government. Since 1970 this has been a
major component of the New Economic
Policy (NEP), through which the govern-
ment hopes to redress poverty by develop-
ment of the rice industry.
The NEP-NRP-Muda Irrigation Scheme
linkage has been evaluated in a corpus of
research material. The verdict has not al-
ways been positive. As early as 1975, a
FAO and World Bank study showed that
although real income of the farmers in-
creased by 2.4 times since the introduction of
double cropping in the region, this increase
was still insufficient to meet the requirement
of an average income.
This problem was again highlighted in
studies conducted by the Center for Policy
* Rancangan Komunikasi, Pusat Pengajian Ilrnu
Kernanusiaan, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pe·
nang, Malaysia
Research (CPR) of the U niversiti Sains
Malaysia. These studies showed that, first,
the gini index for land concentration in the
region increased from 0.354 in 1966 to 0.360
in 1972/73, and to 0.445 in 1975/76 [Gibbons,
Lim, and Sukur 1981].
Second, it was estimated that an average
of about 1,000 farmers lost their tenancy each
year between 1966 and 1975 due to concen-
tration of land holdings. T. G. Lim et at.
[1980] attributed this problem to the repos-
session of land by the owners. To be sure,
high land concentration allows the owners
to exercise their power and influence over
prod uction, marketing, transportation, and
technology [Taussig 1978].
There are many ways in which the landed
interests in the M uda area can exercise this
power and influence. One is through the
Farmers' Associations (FAs) and other rural
institutions. This was shown by a subse-
quent World Bank study [1981] which
reports that the F As in the region had
become bastions for the disbursement of
the val ues, interests, and influence of the
middle and rich farmers, while the small
farmers are hardly represented.
Finally, the irrigation scheme also affected
labourers adversely. The introduction of
technology serioU'sly eroded the income of
wage-labourers in the area by half, which
had not been compensated by an increase in
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wages for the past six to seven years [told.].
The Na#onal .Rlce PoHcy
The contradictions existing within the
Muda Irrigation Scheme cannot be attrib-
uted to the imperfections of the scheme alone.
The scheme is a component of the NRP and
therefore those imperfections should be seen
within the weaknesses of the policy itself.
Since 1970 the government has frequently
revised the NRP in order to accomodate rice
farmers, shifting from an emphasis on pro-
duction in pre-1970 to the need to increase
farm incomes of the farmers after 1970
[Malaysia, Ministry of Agriculture 1979].
These revisions were also precipitated by the
need to synchronize the rice policy with the
poverty-eradication goal of the NEP.
There are four approaches taken by the
government to fulfill the NRP goals. They
are (1) promoting irrigation and the subsidy
of water rates, (2) providing credit and
marketing facilities, (3) providing input sub-
sidies (largely fertilizers), and (4) providing
price support.
With respect to irrigation, the existing sys-
tem is often criticized as being very crude.
Water is supplied simply by spilling it from
one field to another. Where undulating land
makes the flow impossible, farmers with
fields adjacent to the delivery canals suffer a
loss of income due to over-flooding. Simi-
larly, those at a higher level receive no water
for presaturation. To small farmers, such
conditions can severely affect their income,
and they may incur losses when they har-
vest under wet conditions. Besides, the
flooding makes in-field transportation ex-
tremely difficult [Goldman 1975].
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Water for field saturation is still a major
problem in the Muda area. Farmers com-
plain that the present distributary canals
and drainage channels are too far apart,
about 3/4 to 1 mile, so that water takes
thirty days to presaturate one irrigation
block. This has resulted in irrigation and
planting delays. [Khor and Ramli 1988].
The other significant drawback in the irri-
gation infrastructure is that it does not
allow farmers to switch to the production of
other commercially-viable crops. In periods
of higher production costs and lower rate of
return, the irrigation infrastructure does not
allow farmers to cultivate other more renu-
merative crops. Should farmers wish to
cultivate these crops they have to move out
of the irrigation scheme.
The government sees the provision of
rural agricultural credit as part of its
poverty-eradication programme. Prior to
1981, the supervision of rural credit was
entrusted to the Farmers' Organization
Authority (FOA) which, in turn, delegated
this task to the various FAs. After 1981,
this was taken over by the Bank Pertanian
Malaysia (BPM), which presently issues
loans directly to farmers.
One major drawback to the prOVISIon of
credit is that it is given to those who need
it the least. To the extent that credit is
furnished through the FAs, it is inevitable
that middle and large farmers dominate
this facility. If it is provided directly by
BPM, it will invariably allow rural credit to
be monopolised by large farmers.
The inability of small farmers to secure
loans from accredited institutions leaves
them with no option but to get loans from
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middlemen and shopkeepers. In most cases,
the interest charged is to the detriment of
the farmers' income. In his study, John
Purcal [1971] found that 75 percent of the
credit obtained by farmers was used to
purchase food, services, and other non-farm
social and religious needs. No credit in-
stitutions created by the government can
fulfill these credit needs. The alternatives
generally available to the farmers are two in-
formal sources of loans, middlemen and
shopkeepers, and they too are selective in
issuing credits. Horii [1981] showed that
shopkeepers are generally knowledgeable
about the economic conditions of local far-
mers and do not usually grant credit to
small farmers or wage-labourers.
In the area of marketing, the Padi and
Rice Board (Lembaga Padi dan Beras
Negara, LPN) was established to act as a
purchasing monopoly of rice output in most
irrigation schemes in the country. But its
facilities are located entirely in the major
double-cropping regions and its milling
capacity can only accomodate between 20 to
30 percent of the total rice output in the
country [Malaysia, Ministry of Agriculture
1979]. Therefore, in all single-cropping re-
gions and for most output in double-crop-
ping areas, farmers still rely largely on
private millers and purchasers. This allows
the farmers to be manipulated by private
entrepreneurs.
The third approach of the NRP is the
provision of input subsidies. In August
1974, due to rising petroleum prices, the
government started to subsidize the retail
price of fertilizer; farmers paid $10.00 for
a bag which had a market value of $16.00
to $18.00 [Goldman 1975]. In 1975 this
programme was withdrawn as prices stabi-
lized, but in 1979, as a result of severe
drought and declining farm income, the
government in'stituted a free fertilizer pro-
gramme for up to 2.43 ha. (8 1/2 relongs)
per farm operator in all padi farming re-
gions in the country.
One critical weakness of input subsidies,
as it relates to the poverty-eradication pro-
gramme, is that many of the beneficiries are
not necessarily poor. In the Muda region,
for instance, small farms of less than 1.13 ha.
(or 4 relongs) constitute about 62 percent of
the total number of farms but operate only
22 percent of total land acreage [Gibbons
et at. 1981]. The fertilizer subsidy pro-
gramme therefore benefits the other 38
percent of padi farmers who operate about
88 percent of padi land in Muda. The poor
farmers, therefore, are not necessarily the
ones who benefit the most.
Finally, theprice-support programme sim-
ilarly benefits the middle and large far-
mers rather than small farmers. Without
limits on how many relongs a farmer can
operate or how many kilos he can produce,
price support does not necessarily help the
cause of the poor. Furthermore, price-
support is in fact a blessing for the con-
sumer, because the basic premise of price-
support is to ensure a lower rice price in the
retail market. As the urban population is the
largest consumer, it follows that they bene-
fit more when the price is controlled by the
government. If the price of rice were not
controlled (or controlled at a higher-level in
order to reflect the market trend), the cost
would have to be passed on to the con-
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sumer, who would have to shoulder a higher
living cost. But the trade-off is to the bene-
fit of the farmers who, over the years, have
shouldered an increasing cost of production.
Ironically, price support works counter to
the goals of NRP. By keeping the price in
the retail market down, the government has
increased the demand and consumption of
rice by as much as 16 percent. A World
Bank study on the incidence of poverty in
Malaysia [Visaria 1981] showed that rice
consumption increases with income. The
study found that since 30 percent of the
population lives below the poverty line and
consumes only 26.8 percent of total rice pro-
d uction, the remaining 73.2 percent of total
rice sold in the market in Malaysia is con-
sumed by people who are not classified as
poor. Perhaps if the price of padi were set
at $0.70 per kg (instead of $0.63) to reflect
the global market price and the increase
were passed on to the consumer, the demand
for rice would decrease. This would enable
Malaysia to be self-sufficient in rice.
The above analysis of the National Rice
Policy shows that the methods by which the
policy is implemented do not necessarily
reduce rural poverty among padi farm
households. The approaches used to meet
the goals have in fact accentuated the dis-
parity between large and small farmers and
between urban and rural sectors.
The Research Agenda
This study investigates the socio-economic
and cultural impact of the N EP on the
village community in Kampung Kubang
Jawi (KKJ), a not-sa-remote village situated
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in the northwestern corner of the Muda
Irrigation Scheme. It asks, what does the
NEP mean to the villagers in KKJ? What
benefits have accrued to them from the rural
development programmes of the government
since 1970? Is it true that inequality and
poverty have persisted and been exacerbated,
rather than redressed, as a result of the
NEP? If it is true, how do the poor and
destitute cope and survive? How do the
well-to-do thrive? Why aren't the poor be-
nefiting from the new opportunities offered
by the government since 1970? Why has
disparity come to be so? In what form does
it exist? Are the poor aware of their state
of being? If they are, what are they going
to do about it? If not, why not? How do
the changes in the socio-economic affairs of
the village affect family and community re-
lations? What changes do the village
institutions-formal and informal-expe-
rience as a result of the NEP?
Notating the Research Agenda
This study will specifically look into a
number of significant economic indicators
such as land ownership and farm-size pat-
terns, employment and income, and capital
and credit. In addition, it will examine other
factors that are often equated with socio-
economic and cultural matrix of a society
impacted by the NEP.
Macro-level studies into the economic indi-
cators within the Muda region are many;
but studies aiming at understanding the
socia-economic and cultural transformation
of a village society are wanting. This
Kampung Kubang Jawi study should thus
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fill the gap in our understanding of the im-
pact of the New Economic Policy vis-a-vis
the Muda Irrigation Scheme and the Na-
tional Rice Policy at a micro village level.
Land-ownership and Farm-size Patterns
Statistics of land-ownership and farm-
size patterns in the Muda region have
shown that these patterns have altered to-
ward greater polarization and concentration.
In 1975/76, a majority of farmers (about
50 percent) operated small farms (less than
4 relongs or 1.04 ha.); and small farms con-
stituted about 62 percent of total farms in
the region [Gibbons et ale 1981].
With regard to ownership, a gini index
for 1975/76 was at 0.538 for the whole Muda
region as compared to 0.354 for 1965/66.
About 62 percent of the farms in the region
were holdings of less than 4 relongs (1 ha. =
3.84 relongs), and they occupied less than
22 percent of the total padi land in the re-
gion. Furthermore, land holdings of less
than 2 relongs (0.5 ha.) constituted nearly
40 percent of total holdings in the irrigation
scheme. By contrast large holdings of more
than 10 relongs (2.6 ha.) comprised about
11 percent of holdings but occupied
42 percent of total padi land in M uda
[Gibbons et ale 1981].
Farm-size distribution is a more accurate
measurement of disparity because it indi-
cates the accessibility of padi land to farmers.
Studies conducted by the CPR found that
the distribution became even more unequal,
especially after 1970 with the advent of the
irrigation scheme and double cropping. Be-
tween 1955 and 1966, the distribution of
farmland moved somewhat toward equality.
The gini index during this period dropped
from 0.396 to 0.354. Similarly, in this period
the mean farm size for all categories (small,
medium, and large) moved toward equality.
For instance, the mean farm size for small
farms increased from 0.56 to 0.73 ha. and for
large farms the mean decreased from 4.98 to
4.0ha.
But since 1970 the distribution has
changed, moving toward polarization. In the
early phase of double cropping, the mean
farm size for small farms decreased slightly
to 0.69 ha. but more so in 1975/76 (to 0.57
ha.). The number of small farms increased
substantially (from 39.5 percent to 46.8
percent of total farms in Muda). The large
farms, on the other hand, decreased in
the early phase (12 percent) but rose in
1975/76 (from 12 percent to 14.6 percent).
By the same token, the mean size and the
number of large farms increased between
1972/73 and 1975/76..
According to the W orId Bank report
[1981] repossession of farm lands from
tenants by the landowners seems the major
factor in explaining land concentration in
Muda. The Bank reported that this took
place between 1975 and 1976, coinciding
with what it calls "second-round effects," a
period that began a few years after the
introduction of double cropping in the re-
gion.
Employment and Income
In his study on labour utilization in padi
farming in Malaysia, Purcal [1971] found
that farm work per relong under manual
cultivation utilized a total of 796 hours of
labour; 48 percent for harvesting, 12 percent
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for nursery work and transplanting,
20 percent for ploughing and harrowing, and
20 percent for other miscellaneous activities
such as fertilizing, weeding, making and pre-
paring the field ridges. Out of this,
77.3 percent (615 hours) of the labour input
was derived from members of the households
and the rest (22.7 percent or 181 hours) from
hired labour.
With regard to hired labour, a related
study found that 55 percent of the agri-
cultural wage-labourers' income for work in
manual (as opposed to mechanized) cultiva-
tion was derived from harvesting (which
consisted of cutting, threshing, and in-field
transportation) and another 35 percent
from transplanting [World Bank 1981]. In
other words, 90 percent of the income of
wage-labourers was generated from harvest-
ing and transplanting.
Equally important in padi cultivation,
prior to the introduction of double cropping
in the region, is the role of female labour.
Prior to 1970, a noticeable feature was the
presence of women in every phase of padi
cultivation. This was most pronounced d w-
ing transplanting and harvesting. For poor
households, the role of female labour be-
comes most crucial because of the avail-
ability of surplus family labour. Most often,
females were used to form the derau
(reciprocal exchange of labour)or share
workgroup. Purcal also found that, out of
77.3 percent (615 hours) of household labour
put into farm activities, 25.6 percent (204
hours) was contributed by female mem-
bers of the households.
The rapid mechanization and adoption of
new farm practices in Muda since 1970
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have changed the pattern of labour utiliza-
tion and income. The demand for labour
declined dramatically with double cropping,
especially between 1975 and 1979. The
World Bank [1981] notes that the real in-
comes of the farmers were 20 percent less in
1979 than in 1966, with small farmers losing
the most. Owner-tenants, and owner-opera-
tors, by contrast, had greater incomes in
1979 (by 75 percent and 47 percent re-
spectively). The decline of farm income of
small farmers was first observed in the mid-
1960s after tractors began to be used for
land preparation. By the early 1970s, the
rigour of double cropping intensified the use
of tractors, leading to the elimination of
kerbau. In the past, poor farmers who
owned kerbau were able to supplement
their income by ploughing the land of other
farmers. This trend is now reversed.
Large farmers who can afford to buy trac-
tors are able to augment their income by
providing tractor services to other farmers.
Yamashita, Jegatheesan, and Wong [1978]
found that large farmers in Muda received
an average of $334 per year for ploughing
services while small farmers in Muda paid
out an average of $58.00 for these services.
Farm incomes of small and landless far-
mers have been further reduced in recent
years by the introduction of combine harvest-
ers in the late 1970s. According to the
World Bank [1981J, the net loss of hired-
labour income as a result of combine
harvesters was 4,4 percent.
Besides tractors and combine harvesters,
the income of small farmers and wage-
labourers is further reduced by the adop-
tion of direct seeding. If the World Bank
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study is correct, direct seeding in Muda will
result in a further decline of 35 percent of
the income of the farmers when it is fully
implemented. Muda Agricultural Develop-
ment Authority (MADA) estimated that in
the off season of 1983, about 38 percent
(34,300 ha.) of the fields were planted by
direct seeding, and 35 percent in the main
season. In 1984 the acreage under direct
seeding increased to 53 percent. In the off
season of 1987, MADA estimated that over
90 percent of the fields were planted by
direct seeding [Khor and Ramli 1988].
Cap';tat and Cred';t
The capital input of the farmers was
much smaller under single cropping. Land
was still the biggest capital expense for the
farmer, but, since then, spiralling costs have
made it all but unattainable. Capital for
tools and equipment was negligible and
most often did not exceed a net value of
$100.00 [Barnard 1970]. Common tools
used were plough, harrow, hoe, weeding
knife, threshing tub, fork stick for trans-
planting, and so forth. The expensive items
(besides land) were kerbau, which cost from
$200 to $300 each. Many small farmers did
not even own their own kerbau but found it
easier to borrow from relatives and neigh-
bours. Other capital equipment required for
single cropping included a padi store
(jelapang or kepok) and a kerbau stall.
Under single cropping, therefore, land
rent, land preparation (ploughing, harrow-
mg, and hoeing), transplanting, harvesting,
and threshing were the largest capital ex-
penses. In this regard Kuchiba, Tsubouchi,
and Maeda [1979] found that between 1964
and 1970/71 capital requirements for land
preparation, transplanting, harvesting, and
threshing increased only marginally till 1968
but markedly during the inital phase of
double cropping.
Double cropping in the Muda region has
tremendously increased capital requirements
and farm expenditures. Comparing farm
expenses for the years 1964, 1968, and
1970/71, Kuchiba et at. found that the total
expenditure for padi cultivation for the major
phases of production has increased over the
years. In 1964, the total capital costs for
these four major phases (land preparation,
transplanting, harvesting, and threshing)
were $57.00, increasing to $63.50 in 1968. It
remained at $63.00 in 1970/71, the early
phase of double cropping.
The above expenses do not include other
capital costs such as fertilizer, insecticide, in-
field transportation, and transportation to
the mills. For landowners, the land tax and
irrigation fees have to be paid. Also not
included are non-farm capital equipment
such as bicycles, boats, fishnets, and other
tools used by low-income farmers to supple-
ment their household income through fishing
and retailing.
Indebtedness is generally higher among
the Muda padi growers than farmers culti-
vating other crops. This problem is not,
however, related to the high cost of pro-
d uction because farmers rarely seek credit
for farm expenses.
Before the introduction of the fertilizer-
subsidy programme, farmers were exten-
sively indebted to the Chinese shopkeepers
because of the purchases they made. In the
nearby Kampung Padang Lalang, Kuchiba
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et ale [1979] found that farmers usually paid
the fertilizer purchase in kind (padi) at the
end of the harvesting season and they did
so rather dearly.
The introduction of the fertilizer-subsidy
programme removed this source of indebted-
ness among the village community to a cer-
tain extent. The only item of capital ex-
penditure that remains is the purchase of
pesticides and herbicides. All other ex-
penses are service capitals; payments are
often deferred until the end of the harvest-
ing season. Expenses for ploughing, for
instance, are a service capital and so are ex-
penses for transplanting, harvesting, and
transportation. These services are seasonal
in nature and all of them, except for har-
vesting, are now rendered by the farmers
themselves. Harvesting is still a monopoly
of the Chinese entreprenuers, and the com-
bines are largely owned by Chinese con-
tractors.
The government has made a number of
institutional changes to remedy the problem
of indebtedness among farmers in general.
In the late 1950s, it encouraged the for-
mation of rural cooperatives and continued
to do so until 1970. The low-interest loans
provided to the village communities could be
used for land purchase, house construction
and other capital needs. The membership of
these cooperatives were not restricted to the
villagers and farmers. This has resulted in
the domination of these cooperatives by what
Afifuddin Omar [1978: 168] calls "urban-
based" elites such as bureaucrats, school
teachers, and politicians.
With the inception of double cropping, the
government decided to change its emphasis
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on rural credit institutions because coopera-
tive movements did not seem to solve the
problem of rural indebtedness. In addition,
the World Bank pressured the government
to diversify its rural lending facilities before
it wouJd agree to finance the Muda project
[Doering 1973]. This led to an emphasis
on FAs rather than cooperatives. The
rationale for this is that membership in an
FA is restricted to farmers and farm opera-
tors, thus eliminating the source of the
abuse and corruption that plagued the co-
operatives.
CQncurrently, the government established
the BPM and later the FaA. The BPM
channels credit through the FAs. The
FaA, on the other hand, is specifically en-
trusted to supervise and administer the
activities of the FAs. This supervision in-
cludes the power to audit the records and
accounts of the associations as well as to
study the minutes of their meetings.
Credit provided through the F As by BPM,
unlike that of cooperative societies, is limited
to farm expenses alone, specifically tractor
rental costs, fertilizer, pesticides, and trans-
planting. Evaluation of the W orId Bank
with regard to credit provision seems to be
favourable, but in 1982· BPM restructured
its credit scheme and administered its lend-
ing programme directly to the farmers.
Soct'al Structure and Relations
Kinship bonds among village communities
in Malaysia are considered strong. As
Syed Husin wrote about Malay villages in
general
Many people In a village thus tend to
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consider themselves to be relatives
(saudara), while a majority refer to each
other as 'relatives-in-one-village' (saudara
sekampung). There are two types of re-
latives that they distinguish. One is
'close relatives' (saudara dekat) , who in·
clude parents, grandparents, children,
grandchildren, parents' siblings, in both
the paternal and maternal lines, and
parents and siblings of spouses. The line
between 'close' and 'distant relatives'
(saudara jauh) is not clearly defined.
Often when a person vaguely knows that
another individual is his relative, he often
refers to him as a distant relative. There
are, however, two other refers to him as a
distant relative. There are, however, two
other expressions that are used to describe
both close and distant relatives. The
very close kinsmen, especially those who
are related to one another consanguinely,
are often referred to as being 'of one
blood and flesh' (sedarah sedag£ng), while
those who are very distant relatives fre-
q uently describe their relationship merely
as being a 'smell of mango' (bau bacang)
[1975: 45].
Kinship ties help people to ameliorate
economic difficulties. Studies [Syed Husin
1975; Kuchiba et at. 1979] have also found
that kinsmen, especially sedarah sedagz'ng
and saudara dekat relations, are important
to livelihood activities. Syed Husin
explains:
The basic unit of production in the past,
as it is to a great extent today, is the
household unit, and its head provides the
main source of labour. He may be helped
by his wife and some grown-up children
at different stages of agricultural produc-
tion. In padi growing especially, there
are definite stages of work that need to be
done quickly, such as transplanting of
seedlings and harvesting. A man may be
able to cope with the work of ploughing
by himself ... but he cannot harvest his
crops alone, not even with the help of his
wife, at the time of the short dry season
during which the rice needs to be har-
vested quickly. Harvesting needs to be
done immediately when padi is ready, and
a little delay can cause damage and in-
cur losses. The need to do a job quickly
which is beyond the capacity for a farmer
and his family helpers gives rise to the
demand for outside labour [1975: 54].
The role of the homesteads is also a
factor to be considered in any analysis of
village social relations. A homestead, or, as
Kuchiba et at. [1979] call it, a "compound
household group," is made up of households
whose members are related to one another.
In most Malay villages a homestead is usu-
ally made up of three to five households.
The function of these homesteads varies
from one village to another and with the
level of income of the members. The home-
steads of small farmers and landless labou-
rers are more densely populated and serve
numerous socia-economic functions. The
range of services exchanged has no limit-
from borrowing a pinch of salt to loaning a
tractor. It works on the basis of reciprocity
and mutual understanding. They usually
form a derau group for nursery and trans·
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planting work. The labour exchanged be-
tween members of a homestead of small-
cultivators is calculated not in monetary
terms but in reciprocal-exchange value.
By contrast, the homesteads of larger
farmers have larger areas but fewer house-
holds. This is because their children, who
are generally well-educated, migrate to other
parts of the country. These homesteads also
serve limited socio- economic functions be-
cause the members are self-sufficient socially
and economically.
ConcepHon of Injustt'ce
In the preceeding discussion, it was noted
that contradictions and imperfections in the
Muda Irrigation Scheme in particular, and
the National Rice Policy in general, have re-
sulted in the deterioration of the economic
standing of a majority of the population in
the Muda Region. Macro-level studies, es-
pecially the ones by the World Bank and the
CPR, seem to prove this point quantitatively.
But a fundamental question here is, are
these findings and the expressions of con-
cern by scholars similarly shared by the
people in the area? In other words, are the
people aware that there is a high level of
land concentration, depleting sources of em-
ployment and income, displacement of labour
power, and growing control and influence of
large farmers over the shrinking resources?
If they are, at what level of awareness do
they perceive these problems? What are
they going to do about it? What might ex-
plain the inertia and oblivious attitude of the
people? What makes some of them just sit
around and hope for better things in the
future?
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These questions will be addressed in this
study from the standpoint of one fundamen-
tal issue: defiance or obedience. My ob-
jective is to explain why the villagers express
so little anger, disgust, and indignation with
the social order that has apparently exacer-
bated' their hardship and plunged them into
deeper economIC oblivion. Following
Barrington Moore [1978], the analysis begins
with a synthesis of the concept of injustice
as it is perceived by the villagers in Kam-
pung Kubang ]awi.
This synthesis is crucial because it will
serve as a bridge to our assertion of the ex-
propriation of moral anger of the people.
Just because there has been no defiance to
the system, we cannot assume that there is no
injustice or moral outrage in the village.
The deterioration of the economic standards
in Muda is extensive enough to warrant some
expression of outrage. "After all, says
Moore, with the rise of mass production, the
mass market in capitalist societies, govern-
ment control of the economy in socialist
ones, and huge powerful bureaucracies in
both of them, the whole context has changed
in which moral anger arises and finds ex-
pression" [1978: 501].
In the absense of peasant protest and re-
bellion in Malaysia, let alone in the Muda
region, this study will examine the reasons
why peasants, vis-a-vis villagers in Kampung
Kubang Jawi, express so little anger, dis-
gust, and indignation with the social order.
To this end, it is postulated that three fac-
tors may work against this tendency. First,
the relationship between the rich and the
poor has yet to reach the exploitative level
at which outrage can become uncontrollable.
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For this study it is proposed that an analysis
of the ethical mores of the villagers should
be undertaken. These ethical mores inelude
the notion of "exploitation" from the stand-
point of nas£b (fate), rezeki (luck), and
ketekunan (diligence). Other mores will be
included as well.
Second, it is also plausible that there exist
in the village mechanisms which enable the
villagers to cope with the deteriorating viI.
lage economy. These "coping mechanisms"
are a form of support system emanating from
the economic, social, religious, and political
structure and makeup of the village. They
can explain why the moral outrage of the
villagers has yet to be articulated into a
struggle which challenges the social order.
Finally, it is also conceivable that the di-
versity of the village population in Malaysia,
as typified by Kampung Kubang Jawi, has
resulted in the emergence of different sets of
class, and class structure has presumably
acted as an impediment, rather than as a
catalyst, to the expression of anger, outrage,
and disgust.
Class in a Malay Village
With respect to class structure In
Kampung Kubang Jawi, the study will
focus on the income and living standards of
the villagers rather than to follow the con-
ventional definition of class (which features
the mode of production, the mode of surplus
appropriation, and the insertion of the socie-
tal economy into the capitalist world system).
Taking the cue from some scholars, I find
this conventional definition of class wanting
and inadequate. James Scott [1985:42] dis-
missed this definition as reductionist and
mechanistic ; reductionist because it assumes
that once the whole is determined all the
parts will fall in place, and mechanistic as
it dehumanizes actors and turn them into
puppets ("to omit the experience of human
agents from the analysis of class relations is
to have theory swallow its own tail"). For
Immanuel Wallerstein, class analysis which
is anchored in formal models has less ex-
planatory power. He believes that
classes do not have some permanent real·
ity. Rather they are formed, they consoli-
date themselves, they disintegrate or dis-
aggregate, and they are reformed. It is a
process of constant movement, and the
greatest barrier to understanding their
action is reification [1979:224].
It is particularly difficult to apply the con-
ventional definition in an agrarian setting,
especially where large and small-scale culti-
vators exist side by side. Some small-scale
cultivators do own the land they operate,
but this does not necessarily mean they are
capitalists. In his study of a Malay village
in Kelantan, Clive Kessler [1978: 95] found
the categorization of landlords, smallholders,
and tenants to be obscure.
Class analysis in Malaysia, let alone in a
Malaysian village, is complex because of the
absence of class consciousness and solidarity.
According to Bartell Ollman, class conscio-
usness is the outcome of "such purposive
activity with the self as object, of workers
using their reasoning powers on themselves
and their life conditions... they are, both as
calculating human beings and as workers
caught up in inhuman conditions" [1972: 6].
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For him, class conSCIOusness IS attained
through the following steps:
First, workers must recognize that they
have interests. Scond, they must be able
to see their interests as individuals in
their interests as members of a class.
Third, they must be able to distinguish ...
their main interests as workers from other
less important economic interests. Fourth,
they must believe that their class interests
come prior to thier interests as members of
a particular nation, religion, race, etc.
Fifth, they must truly hate their capitalist
exploiters. Sixth, they must have an idea,
however vague, that their situation could
be qualitatively improved. Seventh, they
must believe that they themselves, through
some means or other, can help bring about
this improvement~ Eighth, they must be-
lieve that Marx's strategy, or that advo-
cated by Marxist leaders, offers the best
means for achieving their aims. And
nineth, ...they must not be afraid to act
when the time comes.
But these steps are not easily achieved.
OIlman offers several reasons, which include
(1) conflict among workers because they are
competing for scarce resources such as jobs,
(2) excessive attachment to nation, religion,
and race, (3) inability of workers to recog-
nize capitalism as a "sufficientlly encumbered
target to hate," and (4) workers fail to rec-
ognize that their situation can be q ualita-
tively improved.
In post-independent Black Africa, Waller-
stein [1979: 181] found status group (i.e.
race, national identity, etc.) to be a major
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barrier to the formation of class consciousness.
In Malaysia, kinship relations, rather than
class, appears to be the most important and
immediate cognizance of social ties [Syed
Husin 1975: 67-68].
It is conceivable that there are other
factors, besides kinship identification, that
could deter the formation of class conscious-
ness and alliance in the Malaysian villages.
They include competition among members of
a similar class-the lower class in particular-
for the depleting village economic resources,
differences in the problems and complaints
among the poor against the social order be-
cause they are afflicted rather differently, and
political differences and competition.
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